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REHABILITATION AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING:
A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
BRIAN BROMBERGER*
All hope abandon ye who enter here**
To a considerable extent Dante's admonition to those who enter
the regions of the damned applies equally to persons who have been
convicted of criminal offenses. Such an adverse result clearly con-
flicts with the alms of practically all modern correctional institutions.
One of the major reasons for this conflict is that lawyers have not
been as active as sociologists in an effort to ascertain and remedy those
problems which confront a prior offender upon his return to society
As a result of considerable research carried out by sociologists, educa-
tional and vocational training programs are now an integral part of
most correction programs. However, the failure of lawyers to be in-
volved in similar research has resulted in the development of legal con-
cepts which often work directly against the operation of these re-
habilitation programs. This retardation manifests itself in legislation
and agency regulation which prevents the prior offender from using
his training.
This article examines the aims of two representative state correc-
tional institutions and shows generally how the increase in occupational
licensing, supported by judicial doctrine, works contrary to these pur-
poses.
REHABILITATION-THEORY AND PRACTICE
Theory
The opening of the Elmira Reformatory in 18761 heralded the intro-
duction of vocational training correctional institutions in the United
States.2 The subsequent growth of these training programs reflected an
awareness that prison populations are made up of a greater proportion
* LL.B. (honors), University of Melbourne, 1967; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania,
1971; Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary
**DANTE, DmNA COMEDIA.
1. See generally H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 417-39
(1959).
2. The reformatory movement began at Norfolk Island as part of the Australian
penal settlements under the guidance of Captain Alexander Maconochle (1787-1860)
J. BARRY, ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE AT NORFOLK ISLAND (1958)
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of poorly educated persons than the population at large.3 For the most
part, this lack of education stands as a roadblock to the individual's
efforts to improve his socio-econormc status, and the realization by
the inmate of this impasse can present a serious impediment to rehabili-
tation.4
Unfortunately, vocational training programs have not been the great
successes that their proponents expected.5 Although the reasons for
this lack of success are many and varied, the governmental administra-
tion of the penal system in a particular jurisdiction must shoulder a
large portion of the blame."
Penal establishments are, by their very nature, a drain on the budget
of any government, and attempts to make them self-sufficient have been
generally unsuccessful. 7 With most governments operating at a deficit,
the question of "priorities" is of major importance. Politics, continually
demands a balance between good admnstration and voter popularity
Consequently, the improvement of penal establishments is often placed
low on the list of priorities." The prison lobby has been small and
relatively unsuccessful, leaving only revelation by the press of incidents
of extreme brutality or deviate sexual behavior to spur public interest.9
The results are inevitable: poor facilities; deficient equipment; and
underpaid, poorly qamed staffs, unable to motivate an already reluc-
tant class of "students." 1o The present Chief Justice of the United
3. Friedman & Pappas, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Ad-
ministration of Justice, Training and Employment of Offenders 1 (1967).
4. Id.
5. Even our modern prison system is proceeding on a rather uncertain course
because its admimistration is necessarily a series of compromises. On the one
hand prisons are expected to punish: on the other, they are supposed to
reform. All too frequently restrictive laws force prisoners to idleness
despite the fact that one of their primary objectives s to teach men how
to earn an honest living.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Federal Prisons, 1948, A report of the work of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons 3 (1949).
6. For a summary of adrmnstrative efficiency versus the penal function see H.
BAiP.as & N. Tnmtats, supra note 1, at 462-64.
7. Id. at 536-37
8. See Friedman & Pappas, supra note 3.
9. Various accounts of the cruelty displayed by guards and prison authorities have
been published. See, e.g., H. PAT-rESON & E. CONMAD, SCOMrSBORo Boy (1950). The
public hears little of what actually happens in prisons because the individual inmate has
no opportunity to articulate the situation. *Only when a serious error or fatality occurs
does the public become aware of these problems.
10. The attitudes of many prison personnel are reflected in the response to an at-
tempt by the Western Australian Government to encourage prison guards to attend
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States was probably thinking of these problems when he reminded
members of the bar that "[w] e take on a burden when we put a man
behind walls and that burden is a chance to change." "
It is not difficult to find the stated aims of government with respect
to the operation of the correctional system, and Pennsylvania and
Virginia are typical. In 1969-70 approximately $25 million was appro-
priated for use by the Department of Justice of Pennsylvania;' 2 a con-
siderable portion of this was designated for use by the various correc-
tional institutions throughout the state.' The legislature, in the budget
document, specifically addressed itself to the need for educational and
vocational training to equip the inmate to better cope with society
when he is released. This reflects the opinion that deficiencies in edu-
cation and skilled work experience were among the main causes of
recidivism.' 4
Deeper Insight into the objectives behind the appropriation of money
is gleaned from the specific information that is recorded in the report of
the Pennsylvania Department of Justice. Between 1964 and 1967 the
various correctional institutions were responsible for the issuance of:
(1) 4585 occupational certificates; (2) 594 correspondence course cer-
tificates; (3) 423 other educational certificates; (4) 1307 high school
diplomas; (5) 419 eleventh grade certificates; (6) 191 tenth grade
certificates; and (7) 392 eighth grade certificates. 15 The inclusion of
these figures and those projected for the future in the budget document
clearly indicates that the legislature desires prison officials to concen-
a short course of lectures in basic criminology Before they would comply the guards
demanded; (1) No compulsion, (2) no examinations, (3) overtime pay for attending,
and (4) no promotional priority for those who attended. The authorities were prepared
to accept the first three demands but on their refusal as to (4) the whole scheme
collapsed. Interview with Mr. Williamson, Commissioner of the Freemantle Gaol, in
Perth, Australia, Sept., 1968.
11. The Chief Justice went on to say- "If we deny him that, we deny his status as a
human being and to deny that is to dinumsh our humanity and plant the seeds of future
anguish for ourselves." Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 100th Anniversary
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, reported in the N.Y. Times,
Feb. 18, 1970, at 16, col. 1.
12. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA EXEcUTIVE BuDGr, JULY 1, 1969-JuNE 30, 1970
[hereinafter cited as PA. BtuDxi 1969-70].
13. Of the $25 million appropriated to the Justice Department approximately $21
million was ear-marked for the maintenance of correctional institutions. Id. at 92.
14. Id. at 93.
15. Id. at 94. The reference to occupational certificates does not indicate the standard
of competence required before a certificate is issued.
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trate as much time and effort as possible on the extension of these pro-
grams."'
It is also certain that the legislature no longer regards the training
of inmates for the semi-skilled occupations 7 as the epitome of an
enlightened rehabilitation program. In appropriating funds to one in-
stitution, Camp Hill,' 8 the legislature went so far as to list the activities
that it wished to foster, including "higher education." '9 Innate skepti-
cism might cause such lofty ideals to be treated with the traditional
"gram of salt," but the Annual Report submitted by the administration
of Camp Hill 20 indicates both the feasibility and desirability of such
programs. That the Department of Justice is carrying out the directions
of the legislature is shown by the fact that in 1967 forty-one students
were enrolled in courses at the college level.21 All the courses were
taught by regular college professors. So successful was this program that
m 1968 an agreement was made between the authorities at Camp Hill
and those of the nearby Harrisburg Area Commumty College22 for an
extension of this program. Courses were to be offered in social science,
English, and mathematics, and each course was to carry a value of three
16. Id.
17. An example of this is the training of dental technicians at Pencor State Correc-
tional Institution, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Pencor's dental laboratory compares favor-
ably wth one of similar size in the civilian field, both as to equpment and technical
siils. All men are carefully selected on the basis of special aptitude and ability and
are equipped to construct and repair artificial dentures, both partial and full restorations.
1969 Pa. Bureau of Correction Rep., at 34.
18. The State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill is an institution for youthful
offenders which replaced the industrial school at Huntington, Pennsylvania, m June,
1937 David P. Snare, superintendent, has stated the goals of this institution in the
following terms:
It is the aim of the administration and the entire personnel to utilize all avail-
able and proven techniques m an attempt to return the offender to his
home community as an individual of wholesome character and one ready to
resume his rightful place of responsibility as a law abiding citizen.
Id. at 28.
19. PA. BUDcET 1969-70, supra note 12.
20. See Pa. Bureau of Correction, Report of the Program of Vocational Rehabilitation
for Young Adult Offenders (1969).
21. These students represented the top quartile of the top 200 inmates who had
recently qualified through the General Educational Development Test for Secondary
Diplomas. Id. at 26.
22. The officials involved were Harry A. Snyder, Correctional Education Director,
and W A. Koehline, Dean of Instruction, Harrisburg Area Community College. id. at
28-29.
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credit hours. Eventually 100 inmates' were officially enrolled at the
College with the cost born by the correctional institution. 4
The Division of Corrections of the State of Virginia is also develop-
mg an improved educational system. 5 While a high school education
and vocational training have been available for some time, the availability
of college courses has only recently been introduced." At the Bland
Correctional Farm, college level courses were introduced in the fall of
1971. Although modest in scope, the mere existence of the program is
indicative of the desire of the Department of Welfare and Institutions
to better equip former inmates for their return to society 27
The result of the proliferation of such schemes will certainly be
that the employment potential of prior offenders will extend far
beyond the range of memal occupations 28 to those callings which are
commonly called professions. However, the present restrictions which
apply to the entry of an applicant into a particular profession may
mean that the good work carried out by one agency of government
will be rendered futile by another departmentY9
Practice
The inmate's "chance to change" should not be restricted to a shift
in attitude of those responsible for the operation of the prisons, but the
opportunity must be extended by both the government and the general
population upon his return to society Again, however, a general nega-
tive attitude prevails on the part of both governmental and private
authorities, and even if the period of confinement should achieve the
oft-stated aims of punishment, rehabilitation, and education,30 the prior
offender still finds that he cannot say that he has "paid his debt." Frus-
tration and apathy are inevitable when the convicted person finds that
23. In 1969 the intelligence quotient of those admitted to the program ranged between
95 and 121, with a mean of 107 id.
24. Id.
25. Virginia Department of Welfare and Institutions, Report of the Division of
Correction (Feb. 1972).
26. Id. at 20.
27. The courses offered were freshman English and psychology of human relations.
28. For a summary of those professions which are restricted by requirements for
entry which can preclude the prior offender see the Appendix infra.
29. At the governors' conference in 1951 the governor of Arkansas complained of
the large number of virtually autonomous authorities in his state. He said they function
with utter "lack of responsibility to the people." W GELLHoRN, INDIVIDUAL FREDM
AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTs (1956).
30. See generally, Biurrr & WALLER, CRIMINAL LAW (1965).
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there is considerable conflict between the aims of the correctional sys-
tem and the operation of those departments of government responsible
for his employment upon his release.
Two surveys of private employers, conducted 10 years apart,3'
reveal that over 60 percent have considerable reservations about em-
ploying ex-offenders. These reservations vary from a total refusal .to
restricting the hiring of offenders for certain specific positions 2 Trade
uions may deny membership, 33 and m occupations where insurance
bonding is customary, persons with criminal records are almost unem-
ployable."
When the government acts in its capacity as an employer, suspicion
manifests itself in two ways: by policy, which is in reality the attitude
31. J. Ryan, R. Vebb & N. Mandel, Offender Employment Resource Survey for, the
Minnesota Department of Corrections (1966); E. Sparer, Employability and the Juvenile
"Arrest" Record 5 (1956)
32. An attitude typical of that of most personnel procurement directors in private
industrv was expressed by P W Morris, Director, Personnel Department, Inland Steel
Company in 4 FED. PaoB. 34 (1970). Mr. Morris wrote:
No applicant will be denied consideration for employment solely because
of a criminal record.
Criminal record will be simply one aspect in a total assessment of an appli-
cant. It will enhance the application if the applicant is sponsored by
a probation or parole officer, clergyman, social worker, or other reputable
persons who have knowledge about the applicant and have a specific interest
in his rehabilitation,
Applicants convicted of arson, sex offenses, narcotic offenses, or crimes of
violence will not generally be given serious consideration for employment
except where there are mitigating circumstances.
33. Friedman & Pappas, supra note 3, at 42.
34. James J. McFadden, former New York City Labor Commissioner, stated that a
training program which graduated 550 men with records had great difficulty in-finding
employment for them because of deial of bond. City Job-Bonding Sernce Urged to
Aid Ex-Conncts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1965, at 1, col. 5.
Note also the problems faced by the prior offender when he seeks credit. Nearly
every, application for finance includes a question relating to prior offenses. The offices
of three Philadelphia banks indicated that where there is any doubt at all as to whether
a loan will be approved the existence of a record will decide the issue negatively. The
same banks stated that generally there is a more stringent collateral requirement for an
ex-offender. Credit companies similarly regard the ex-offender as a bad risk. The prob-
lem here is particularly acute since these compames normally utilize computerized
credit bureaus rather than individual credit investigations. The current programs com-
mon in the credit bureau industry do not allow for the removal of a record of an
offense once it has been entered into the computer's memory bank. See Hess & Le
Poole, Abuse of Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conmction, 13 GRaM. & DEL. 494, 499
(1967).
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shown toward the ex-offender by the bureaucracy, and by legislation.
The following examples show the need for considerable rethmking by
legislatures in the area under discussion.
On May 11, 1961, Linton K. Mordecai, aged 17, was convicted of
rape and robbery 35 There is every indication that at this stage of his
life he was a most unpleasant young man.3 He was sentenced to 20
years imprisonment and was paroled in 1968 after having served seven
years at the federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.st While
in prison Mordecai attended trade school, and at the time of his release
he had become an extremely competent printer. He subsequently
applied for a position with the federal government, only to be in-
formed that it was not the government's practice to employ people with
records such as his.38 He is at present earning his living as a truck driver
and has given every indication that as far as he is concerned the system
has functioned correctly and he has no intention of returning to a life
of crime.
The second example is much more tragic. Ayle Thomas was a bus
driver employed by the Evangeline Parish School Board. Article VIII,
Section 6 of the Louisiana Constitution (1921) prevents the employ-
ment of persons in positions of trust or profit who have criminal rec-
ords.39 Thomas had committed the offense of breaking and entering
in 1937 40 After serving a prison term he was employed by the school
board from 1952 until his dismissal in 1961. The stated ground for
dismissal was his prior offense. Thomas contended that he had been
wrongfully dismissed, and on review the Court of Appeals of Louisiana
held that bus driving for a school board is a position of trust or profit,
35. Mordecai v. United States, 252 F Supp. 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
36. Mordecai was charged with eight counts of unauthorized use of a vehicle, grand
larceny, assault with intent to kill, assault with intent to rob, robbery, and two rape
offenses. 252 F Supp. at 699.
37. One of the grounds for a subsequent appeal was that Lewisburg is an adult prison
and while he was incarcerated there he was not segregated from the adult prisoners as
is required by 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1970) Brief for the Appellant, Mordecai v. United
States, 252 F Supp. 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. Although not specifically stated in the appellate brief, one of the main reasons
why there was an attempt to obtain a retroactive application of Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966) was the different impediments which follow a juvenile conviction
as distinct from an adult conviction. Information furnished by Paul Bender, counsel
for the appellant.
39. Thomas v. Evangeline Parish School Bd., 138 So. 2d 658 (La. Ct. App. 1962)
40. Id. at 659.
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that the statute was valid legislation, that the time between the offense
and the dismissal was irrelevant, and that the dismissal should stand.4
With incidents such as these, apparently not Infrequent,4 2 it is not
surprising that there are feelings of futility and frustration among the
prison population. Even if it is possible to understand the suspicions
of private individuals, it is far less reasonable for government to operate
on the same basis. It is disappointing that laws and regulations should
operate on the presumption of failure, because the state affects the
future of the ex-offender by, in some instances, denying him the right
to vote, the right to hold public office,4 5 the right to act as a trustee,'
the right to enter various occupations, 47 and even the right to be buried
in certain cemeteries.48
The responsibility of the state for the difficulty in attaining employ-
ment experienced by many ex-offenders extends to instances where it
is not acting directly as employer. In many regulated occupations prior
offenders are specifically excluded, 9 and in others they may be ex-
cluded at the discretion of a semi-autonomous board established by the
legislature to administer the particular occupation. The number of
occupations which are controlled by regulation and are governed by
admimstrative boards has increased substantially over the past 50 years.5 '
In 1955 Professor Gellhorn wrote: 52
41. Id.
42. "Those of us who deal with the daily practicalities presented by the bread and
butter portions of court calenders find that, in the main, irreparable injury is done a de-
fendant acquitted after a trial: the fact of his arrest is often sufficient to rule him out
of consideration for employment." Judge Irving Ben Cooper, S.D.N.Y., quoted rm
Hess & LePoole, supra note 34, at 494.
43. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. S 8667 (1956)- '"Every person who has been or shall
hereafter be convicted of felony, manslaughter excepted, shall be incapable of obtaining
a license to practice law; or, if already licensed, the court shall enter an order
disbarring such convict."
If the disabilities are to continue after the completion of the sentence, then the obvious
presumption is that the time spent either in prison or on probation or parole is not
achieving its aims, especially when many of these disabilities continue indefinitely
44. E.g., Wyo. CONsT. art. 6, § 6. (Unless pardoned)
45. E.g., N.C. CoNrr. art. VI § 8. (Unless pardoned).
46. E.g., N.D. CENT. CoDE § 30-11-01 (1960).
47. See Appendix infra.
48. E.g., Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
49. See note 43 supra.
50. E.g., pharmacists m West Virginia. W VA. CoDE ANN. S 30-5-7 (1966) (Board
may revoke or refuse to issue license if convicted of a felony or any crime involving
moral turpitude).
51. W GELLHORN, supra note 29, at 110.
52. Id. at 106.
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One may not be surprised to learn that pharmacists, accountants,
and dentists have been reached by State laws as have sanitarians
and psychologists, assayers and architects, veterinarians and li-
branans. But with what joy of discovery does one learn about
the licensing of threshing machine operators and dealers in scrap
tobacco? What of egg graders and guide dog trainers, pest con-
trollers and yacht salesmen, tree surgeons and well diggers, tile
layers and potato growers? And what of the hypertrichologists
who are licensed in Connecticut where they remove excessive and
unsightly hairs with the solemnity appropriate to their high sound-
ing title?
In a single session5 the New Jersey legislature heard calls for licensing
of bait fishing boats, beauty shops, chain stores, florists, insurance ad-
justers, photographers, and master plumbers; not one of these proposals
was the result of a complaint from a swindled or duped citizen."
At first blush, it may appear to be surprising that there is a great
desire on the part of many trade groups to place themselves under the
regulatory arm of government. 5 However, in a complex society such
as exists in the United States, there seems to be a psychological need
for self-identification.56 Few people are capable of achieving this as
individuals, but many can do so by identifying themselves with some
sub-group. Evidence of this phenomenon is shown by the euphemistic
titles that formerly simple occupations take on once they become offi-
cial. Professor Gellhorn's hypertrichologists and the santation engi-
neer (once known as the garbage man) are examples of this tendency 57
Again, corresponding to "officiality," there begins the inevitable move
by the group toward an upgrading of social and economic status. For
example, one can read from a licensed group statement that:
We are not laboring people. Our work requires a certain learned
knowledge, and is requiring more all the time. We must be skill-
ful in certain movements and manipulations of the hands and
53. Id. at 110.
54. Id.
55. This is to be distinguished from the formation of private guilds made under
government charter.
56. Monaghan, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41
B.U.L. REV. 157, 163 (1961).
57. "[They] seek the social and psychological satisfaction which they think will come
from elevating a humble and honorable trade into a profession, replete with examina-
tions, standards, boards, and a terminology smacking of'the scientific." Id. See also
Fellman, The Alien's Right to Work, 22 MINN. L. REv. 137 (1938)
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fingers. It requires a certain skillful technique in the use of deli-
cate tools, instruments, and appliances. It requires adaptation and
coordination of eye and brain, nerve and muscle. We are not
laboring people. We are building a profession.58
What is the "joy of discovery" when it is learned that the person who
carries out the highly technical process described above is the local
barber?
Social and economic status improves when the group has the ability
to restrict entry Preservation of the improved status then becomes
vitally important. Socially, the inevitable increase m training and
schooling required for entry into the group increases the cost, thereby
decreasing the number of prospective applicants59 and reducing the
number of new members. In a society whose population is steadily
growing, there is a built-in increase in demand; thus the ultimate result
of the process is an increase in the value of the performed service.
The history of the licensing of hypertrichologists in Massachusetts'"
illustrates that potentially regulated groups do not regard the above
analysis lightly In 1954 a Massachusetts group began a campaign to
have their body licensed, and a bill was introduced "for regulating the
practice of electrolysis." 62 Joan Wemrib" was also interested in the
legislation, and sought to have the jurisdiction of the existing hair-
dresser's board extended to cover hair removers. The legislature took
no action on either proposal. In 1955 the state senate approved a peti-
tion from the Association of Electrologists Inc. for the creation of a
state licensing board.' The house, however, received a committee
58. Master Barber Mag., vol. 19, Apr., 1959, at 7
59. W. GELLHORN, supra note 29, at 110.
60. People v. Brown, 407 fI1. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1951)
For a discussion of apprenticeship prerequisites, see Note, Retsrctions of Freedom of
Entry into the Building Trades, 38 IowA L. Rav. 556 (1953).
If the proper inquiry were limited solely to the private economic interests
of the parties, the statute would appear to be unreasonable since it dis-
criminates against retail laboratories for the benefit of dentists and whole-
sale laboratories. However, whereas in this area important questions of
public health are involved the validity of a statute must be measured pri-
marily by the reasonable necessity of the regulation in safeguarding the
public rather than the effect of the statute upon private economc interest.
Comment, Dentists, Dental Laboratories and the Public Interest, 51 Nw. U.L. REV.
123, 126 (1956).
61. Monaghan, supra note 56.
62. 1954 MAss. S. JoUR. 171; 1954 MAss. H.R. JoUa. 151.
63. 1954 MAss. S. JouR. 45; 1954 MAss. H.R. JoUa. 234.
64. 1955 MASS. S. JOUR. 178.
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report which suggested that the practice of removing hair could only
be performed under the supervision of a physician.65 In 1956 the
matter was again before the legislature, but no action was taken.66 In
1957 separate petitions were introduced in both houses, ' 7 but the house
committee on ways and means gave an unfavorable opinion on the
proposed legislation"8 thus defeating the bill. 0 In 1958 new petitions
were introduced.70 This time the house committee report was favor-
able and the final bill passed with ease.7
Board Dscretion
Assuming that the schemes at Camp Hill and Bland Farm continue
to operate, that a reasonable percentage of the previously non-moti-
vated realize their potential, and that bar associations, medical boards,
barber's boards, and other such administrative agences72 continue their
restrictive attitude toward prior offenders, an impasse will be reached.
At present, a prior offender who possesses certain occupational skills
obtained before, during, or after conviction may be prevented from
using those skills,73 thus frustrating any chance of rehabilitation. These
prohibitions come in the guise of occupational licensing legislation74
or regulation.75 Prohibitory legislation of this type generally takes one
of three forms: (1) legislation which specifically refers to particular
crimes;70 (2) legislation which refers to offenses involving moral turpi-
tude; and (3) legislation which enables a personnel officer or adminis-
trative board to refuse permission because the applicant has not satis-
factorily shown that he possesses good moral character.77 The relative
strengths of the combatants in the potential impasse can be seen from
a general survey of the attitudes of the courts toward the challenges
which have been raised against various occupational licensing statutes.
65. 1955 MASS. H.R. JoUR. 1106.
66. 1956 MASS. S. JouR. 988; 1956 MAss. H.R. JOUR. 1398.
67. 1957 MASS. S. JOUR. 195; 1957 MASS. H.R. JOUR. 182.
68. 1957 MASS. H.R. JOUR. 1412.
69. Id. at 1412.
70. 1958 MAss. S. JoUR. 44, 182; 1958 MASs. H.R. JOUR. 162.
71. 1958 MAss. S. Jootn. 1436; 1958 MAss. H.R. JouR. 1909
72. See Appendix infra.
73. See Appendix znfra.
74. See note 43 supra (concerning attorneys in Mississippi)
75. See Appendix infra (concerning restrictions in the civil service)
76. See Appendix infra.
77. See Appendix tnfra.
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SURVEY
The authority of the state to legislate in the field of occupational
licenses has long been recogmzed 78 as a proper exercise of its police
power.79 This is a residual power which enables the state to protect the
health, welfare, and morals of the populace. ° The exercise of the
police power by the states in this area has not always been as extensive
as at present,8 ' and until the end of the nineteenth century few occu-
pations were subject to state licensing 82 The application of the police
power to occupational licensing is of special interest not only because
the courts have permitted it to be used extensively, but because the
increase in regulated occupations has seriously reduced the number of
employment choices available to the released prior offender.a
When the use of the police power in this field has been challenged,
the courts have applied stringent verbal tests, but have, at the same time,
given these tests the widest possible practical application. The cases
have continually stated that the police power must be used carefully,
with great caution, and "only where such legislation bears a real and
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or some other
phase of public welfare." 84
78. The power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure
or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity
as well as deception and fraud. As one means to this end it has been the
practice of different states, from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits
a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may con-
fidently rely The nature and extent of the qualifications required must
depend primarily upon the judgment of the state as to their necessity
Dent v. West Virgima, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1899). Accord, Rosenblatt v. Bd. of Phar-
macy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72-73, 158 P.2d 199 (1945). See also Council of State Govern-
ments, Occupational Licensing Legislation in the States 6 (1952); Note, Entrance and
Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in California, 14 STAN. L. REV.
533 (1962).
79. E.g., Ex parte Mali, 56 Cal. App. 2d 635, 133 P.2d 64 (1943).
80. Raleigh v. Norfolk S. Ry., 275 N.C. 454, 168 SE.2d 389 (1969). But see Whaley
v. Lenoir County, 275 N.C. 319, 168 S.E.2d 411 (1969) where the court said, 'The State
cannot, under guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business
or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unnecessary or unreasonable restrictions."
This case is interesting because the "grandfather clause" imposed conditions on existing
practitioners.
81. W GELLHORN, supra note 29, at 106.
82. Id. The increase in state control over what were formerly regarded as ordinary
occupations has produced a situation which some regard as not dissimilar to the medieval
guild system. Grant, The Gild Returns to America, 4 J. POL. 303, 458 (1942).
83. See Appendix mnfra.
84. Liggett Co. v. Baldndge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928).
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In State v. Warren, 5 the court used typically restrictive language.
It spoke of the right to earn a livelihood as a "property right" s' which
may not be lightly affected.87 In the court's opinion "[r] estrictions and
regulatory standards may not be applied so as to prevent individuals
from truly engaging in ordinary trades and occupations in which men
have immemorially engaged as a matter of common right." 88 (Emphasis
supplied) The court went even further by stating that before a
statute which purports to regulate an occupation can be sustained, it
must affirmatively appear that it has a real and substantive relation to
one or more of the purposes with which the police power is concerned
and that the occupation to be regulated must have a "substantial public
interest." The legislative act also must be reasonably necessary to
promote the "public good." But the limits of the police power are
exceeded when the legislature undertakes by regulation to rid ordinary
occupations and callings of the dishonest and morally decadent." Re-
sort in such circumstances must be made to the criminal law 9 Although
these phrases would appear to be used as tests, in actuality they turn
out to be merely admonitions. The holding that a statute which regu-
lated real estate brokers92 was a valid exercise of the police power
illustrates this.
A more direct approach was taken by the Supreme Court in Breard
v. City of Alexandria.93 As in Warren, the issue was the validity of a
licensing ordinance. The City of Alexandria had passed an ordinance
which prohibited peddlers or canvassers from calling on occupants of
private residences without having been requested to do so. When prose-
cuted for a breach of this ordinance, Breard, who had been peddling
books, contended that the ordinance placed an unconstitutional re-
striction upon a citizen's right to engage in one of the common occupa-
tions of life. Speaking for the court,9 4 Mr. Justice Reed, while rejecting
85. 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660 (1960).
86. "[The] right to work and earn a livelihood is a property right that may not be
denied except under the police power of the state m the public interest for reasons of
health, safety, morals or public welfare." 114 S.E.2d at 663.
87. 114 S.E.2d at 662.
88. 114 S.E.2d at 664.
89. 114 S.E.2d at 692.
90. 114 S.E.2d at 693.
91. Id.
92. See Appendix nfra (concerning restrictive requirements as applied to real estate
brokers).
93. 341 U.S. 622 (1955) Cf. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)
94. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, urging that the application of the ordinance
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this argument, sidestepped the issue of the breadth of the police power
by holding "that even a legitimate occupation may be restricted or pro-
hibited in the public interest . . . The problem is legislative where
there are reasonable grounds for legislative action." 95 The holding is
a judicial recognition that in society today there are few occupations
which, if carelessly performed, do not in some way effect the public
health or welfare. Presumably those which would be excluded include
those which are "one of the innocent, usual occupations in which
everybody who so wishes may indulge as a past-time or a hobby or a
vocation, without harm or injury to anybody, or to the general wel-
fare, or the public health and morals, or the peace, safety and comfort
of the people." 96 The usefulness and extent of such a test is a matter
of pure speculation.97
The rationale of the court in Breard8 would appear to be more
realistic than that of the court in Warren.9 9 There is little point in
denying the legislative right in theory while permitting it in practice.
A policy such as that adopted in Breard would be supported by those
who believe that in order to maintain a viable federalism the Supreme
Court must not act as a "State legislative watcher." Such a policy was
suggested by both Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes in many dis-
senting opnions'00 written earlier in this century, dissents which the
majority of the Court now seem to favor. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the majority in Day-Brite Lighting Co. v. Missouri, noted:
to convict a magazine salesman unconstitutionally abridged free speech guarantees. 341
U.S. at 649. Justice Black, however, added, "Of course I believe that the present
ordinance could constitutionally be applied to a 'merchant' who goes from door to door
'selling pots"' 341 U.S. at 650 n.
95. 341 U.S. at 632-33.
96. Buehman v. Bechel, 57 Ariz. 363, 367, 114 P.2d 227, 229 (1941).
97. In Oklahoma watchmaking licenses have been invalidated, State ex rel. Whetsel
v. Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 248 P.2d 612 (1952), but the licensing of dry cleaning estab-
lishments has been upheld, Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Olda. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938).
98. 341 US. 622 (1955).
99. 252 N.C. 690, 114 SZE.2d 660 (1960).
100. Monaghan, supra note 56, at 163.
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an important part of the commumty de-
sires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states, even though
the experiment may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose
judgment I respect.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Tyson
& Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-47 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schlesinger
v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Our recent decisions make it plain that we do not sit as a super
legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide
whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.
The legislative power has limits but the state legislatures have
constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques. They
are entitled to their own standards of the public welfare: they
may within broad limits control practices in the business-labor
field, so long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated
and so long as conflicts with valid and controlling federal laws
are avoided.ioi
Notwithstanding what has been said, the courts have refused to up-
hold certain legislation on the grounds that there was not even a nomi-
nal relationship to the health or safety of the public. Such legislation
has been held improper in seeking to regulate watchmakers,0 2 florists, 0 3
and photographers.es
This general reaction of the courts to challenges by dissatisfied
applicants to the constitutionality of particular licensing legislation has
not been affected by revelations that the protection of the health, wel-
fare, and morals of the populace was not the driving force behind the
legislation. In Daniel v. Family Life Insurance Co.,1°5 a company had
been formed to offer for sale "burial insurance." 10' As a result of a
lobby from other insurance companies, °7 the South Carolina legislature
passed an act barring the sale of insurance by undertakers.0 s The trial
court held that the legislation was invalid because it was not enacted
"in the public interest" 109 and that it "had its genesis in the desire of
the existing insurance companies to eliminate the plaintiff company as
a competitor." 11o On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Murphy, speaking for the Court, said:
101. 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)
102. State ex reL Whetsel v. Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 248 P.2d 612 (1952)
103. Kresge Co. v. Couzens, 290 Mich. 185, 287 N.W 427 (1939)
104. Sullivan v. DeCerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So. 2d 571 (1945); State v Gleason, 277
P.2d 530 (Mont. 1954); State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D 565, 9 N.W.2d 914 (1943)
105. 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
106. The company was using undertakers to sell small policies which were designed
to mature at death and pay for the cost of burial of the policy holder. Id.
107. W GELLHORN, supra note 29, at 120.
108. Act of May 12, 1947, 45 S.C. Stat. 322.
109. "There is nothing to show that the interest of the public generally, as dis-
tnguished from other industrial insurance companies, requires such interference."
Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 79 F Supp. 62, 66 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
110. 79F Supp. at65.
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It is said that the insurance lobby obtained this statute from the
South Carolina Legislature. But a judiciary must judge by results,
not by the varied factors which may have determined legislators
votes. We cannot undertake to search for motive in testing con-
stitutionality
We cannot say that South Carolina is not entitled to call the
funeral insurance business an evil. Nor can we say that the statute
has no relation to the elimination of those evils."'
Professor Gellhorn suggests that judicial self-restraint is praise-
worthy 1112 He argues that the role of the court should not be confused
with that of a legislature and that m a democratic society the court
should not substitute its views for those of elected representatives."
This thesis is undoubtedly correct, but it does not take into account the
pressures that can be applied to the elected representatives and the
practical effect of a persistent and influential lobby
DELEGATED AUTHORITY AND DIsCRETION
The only practical way in which a modern legislature can administer
regulatory legislation is by the creation of adnmistrative agencies, and
occupational licensing is no exception.1 4 Just as the courts are permis-
111. Danel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949)
112. W GELLHORN, supra note 29, at 120.
113. Id. at 121.
114. Typical of such legislation is that which controls dentistry in the state of
Kansas.
[I~n order to accomplish the purpose and to provide for the enforcement of
this act, there is hereby created the Kansas dental board. Said board shall
be vested with authority to carry out the purposes and enforce the pro-
visions of this act. The board shall consist of three licensed and qualified
dentists.
The powers and duties of the board are extremely wide:
Powers and dunes. The board shall exercise, subject to the provisions of
this act, the following powers and dunes:
a) It shall adopt such rules for its government as it may deem proper.
b) Make rules for qualification and licensing of dental hygienists.
c) Makes rules and regulations regarding sanitation.
d) Conduct examinations to ascertain the qualification and fitness of
applicants for licenses as dentists, or certificates as specialists in dentistry
e) Pass upon the qualifications of applicants for reciprocal licenses.
f) Prescribe rules and regulations for examination of candidates.
g) Formulate rules and regulations by which dental schools and colleges
shall be approved.
h) Grant licenses, issue license certificates and renewal certificates in
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sive in sustaining the proliferation of licensed callings, so are they per-
rmssive toward the degree of discretion that may be granted to a
licensing board.
It might be thought that a desire for a restrictive use of the police
power vis-a-vis a desire for some form of occupational regulation
would result in a compromise manifested by a limit to the discretion
given to the board. This has not been the case. Barsky v. New York
Board of Regents"15 is one example of the results which follow when
a court restricts its investigation to the existence of a power and treats
the application of that power as being outside its jurisdiction.
In Barsky a statute which gave the Board of Regents the power to
discipline a medical practitioner when he had been "convicted in a
court of competent jurisdiction either within or without this state of a
crime. " was challenged. 11 6 Barsky was a medical practitioner of
long standing, undoubted ability, and good reputation. He was associ-
ated with the American Anti-Fascist League which had been founded
in the late 1930's. The Anti-Fascist League found its way onto the
Attorney General's list,l"T and Barsky was subsequently called before
a Senate hearing and asked to produce some documents, one of which
conformity with this act to such applicants and dentists as have been found
qualified.
i) Conduct hearings or proceedings to revoke or suspend and to revoke
or suspend a license, license certificate or renewal certificate granted
under the authority of this act or previous acts.
j) Employ such persons as it may deem necessary to assist it in carrying
out its duties in the administration and enforcement of this act, and to
provide offices, furniture, fixtures, supplies, printing, or secretarial services,
and may expend such funds as may be deemed necessary thereof, and may
appoint an attorney to advise and assist m the carrying out and enforcing
of the provisions of this act.
k) To investigate violations of the act that may come to the knowledge
of the board, and to institute or cause to be instituted before the board
or in a proper court appropriate proceedings in connection therewith.
I) To adopt rules and regulations to carry out and make effective the
provisions of this act, and to modify or repeal said rules and regulations
whenever in the discretion of the board it is deemed necessary
KAN. STAT. ArN. § 74-1406 (1967).
115. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
116. ld. at 443.
117. The general fear of communism which existed in the United States after World
War II resulted in the investigation of persons and organizations that were thought to
have or have had any connection with communism. Although it seems as though there
were relatively few actual prosecutions, the public investigation of such people as
Einstein and Oppenheimer acted on them as would a criminal prosecution. See 347
US. at'472 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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included a list of members of the League. Among the members were
many people who had relatives living in Franco-dommated Spare, and
Barsky did not wish to publicize their names for fear of reprisals. At
the hearing, on the advice of counsel, he refused to produce the docu-
ments and was subsequently cited for and convicted of contempt. *He
served a short prison term,1'8 but when he was released the Board of
Regents suspended him from practice for six months. Barsky filed suit
In the district court, and the matter eventually reached the Supreme
Court."19 The Court held, 2 ° over a strong dissent,' 2' that the behavior
of Barsky was not too far removed from the State's legitimate concern
for professional standards, 122 and that the action of the Board of Re-
gents in suspending Barsky was within their delegated power. Justice
Douglas, who had earlier expressed the opinion in Day-Brite that
the Supreme Court should not act as a super legislature, thought that the
Board of Regents should not possess such discretion. 24 He implied
that when the power to revoke a license is delegated the agency must
at least be required to find some correlation between the offense and
the actual practice of medicine. "The fact that a doctor needs a good
knowledge of biology is no excuse for suspending his license because
he has little knowledge of constitutional law" 125
justice Frankfurter, dissenting in a separate opinion, wrote:
It is one thing thus to recognize the freedom which the consti-
tution wisely leaves to the states in regulating professions. It is
quite another thing, however, to sanction a State's deprivation or
partial destruction of a man's professional life on grounds having
no possible relation to fitness, intellectual or moral, to pursue his
profession. 26
118. Five months.
119. 347 U.S.442 (1954).
120. Chief Justice Warren with Justices Reed, Jackson, Burton, Clark, and Minton.
121. Justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter.
122. "[Alnd there appeared to be no evidence of arbitrary or capricious behavior."
347 U.S. at 444. It could be suggested that behavior which had no relation to the
practice of the particular profession must necessarily be arbitrary
123. Day-Brite Lighting Co. v. Missouri, 342 US. 421 (1952).
124. "It does a man little good to stay alive and free and propertied, if he cannot
work." 347 U.S. at 472 (Douglas, J, dissenting).
Justice Black added, "[Ilt has permitted Dr. Barsky to be tried by an agency vested
with legislative-executive-judicial powers so broad and so devoid of legislative standardk
or guides that it is in effect not a tribunal operating within ordinary safeguards of
law. " 347 U.S. at 456 (Black, J., dissenting).
125. 347 U.S. at 473-74.
126. Id. at 475.
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The administration of a licensed occupation by a board often pro-
vides the general public with a necessary service. Education and train-
ing requirements ensure that the practitioner will at least have attained
a certain level of competence, and the existence of the board with its
power to revoke licenses 127 often provides the dissatisfied consumer with
a more practical, speedier, and less expensive forum in which to air his
complaint.128 There is, however, a necessary caveat: Both the judicial
and legislative branches of government should not permit subordinate
agencies to exercise power and discretion above that which is needed
for the efficient accomplishment of their established purpose.
DISCRETION AND CRIMINAL RECORDS
As has already been suggested, when a statute which purports to
regulate an occupation is challenged, most courts have confined their
consideration to an analysis of the constitutional right of the state to
use the police power in the particular instance,' 29 and have not been
prepared to pass judgment on the wisdom of its use. Indeed, once the
power to legislate has been acknowledged most courts will sustain the
challenge only if it can be shown that the use of the police power has
been arbitrary and capricious. 130 The investigatory procedure which
is required in order to demonstrate that a board has acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner often places a substantial burden on the potential
licensee, thus leaving the possibility of such a claim available only to
the affluent.' 31
An example of this was the New York Boxing Commission's denial
of a license to Cassius Clay (Muhammed Ali) In 1967 Clay was con-
victed of draft evasion, and at the time he filed his application with the
Commission he was free on bail pending appeal.' 82 Almost immediately
127. See Appendix mfra.
128. As the item or service involved is likely to be relatively small in value and the
complainant probably only wants it replaced or fixed, a resort to the courts with their
traditional tardiness to order specific performance would not be satisfactory
129. Day-Brite Lighting Co. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952)
130. Id.
131. The cost of discovery for the case discussed in notes 132-39 rnfra must have
been quite substantial and certainly beyond the range of the typical recently released
offender. For a detailed listing of the findings, see Ali v. Division of State Athletic
Comm'n, 316 F Supp. 1246, 1248-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
132. Clay v. Umted States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v Clay,
430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970). Clay's conviction was recently overturned by the Supreme
Court. United States v. Clay, 91 S. Ct. 2068 (1971)
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following his conviction he was stripped of his heavyweight ttle,lin
and his license to box in all states was withdrawn. He re-applied for
a license in New York State'8 4 where the Boxing Commission, acting
under the authority granted by the legislature,' 35 refused his applica-
tion. Clay had not worked in any other capacity than that of profes-
sional boxer for many years, and the denial of the license was an effec-
tive denial of his right to work.16 Initially,1 7 the denial was upheld
by the courts as a valid exercise of the police power, but in 1970 the
case was reopened. Clay argued that the only possible ground that the
Commission could rely on in refusing to renew his license was that he
had been convicted of a criminal offense. After considerable research,
which was carried out at great expense,88 Clay's attorneys discovered
that the Comnussion, had issued licenses, both before and after Clay's
conviction, to persons with criminal records. In fact, they were able
to demonstrate a breakdown of the Commission's licensing practices.
With these facts to guide them, the court was able to measure the Com-
mission's action against some objective standard, and therefore had
little difficulty in reaching the decision that there had been an arbitrary
and capricious denial on the part of the Comrmssion. 3 9
In the Clay case the court was able to make its decision by objectively
examining a set of facts; more often than not, the claim of arbitrary and
133. "Heavy-weight champion of the world." The stripping of the title is relevant
because of the endorsements and other forms of income which result directly there-
from.
134. September 22, 1969.
135. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8910 (McKinney 1952).
136. Demal of a license to box has barred Ali from pursuing in New York his
chosen trade, from which he earned his living for most of his adult years
prior to 1967, with but a limited number of years remaining m which he
can meet the rigorous physical standards essential to engaging m such
activity It is clear that unless preliminary relief is granted he will suffer
irreparable injury
Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 316 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
137. Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 308 F Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
138. 316 F. Supp. 1246.
139. If the commission in the present case had demed licenses to all applicants
convicted of crimes or military offenses, plaintiff would have no valid
basis for demanding that a license be issued to him. But the action of the
commission in denying him a license because of his refusal to serve in the
armed forces while granting licenses to hundreds of other applicants con-
victed of other crimes and military offenses involving moral turpitude
appears on its face to be intentional, arbitrary and unreasonable discrimma-
tion against plaintiff, not even-handed admimstration of the law which the
Fourteenth Admendment requires.
id. at 1250.
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capricious activity on behalf of a board has to be based on a more sub-
jective analysis. This subjectivity arises because of the prevalence in
licensing legislation of the power granted to the licensing board to re-
fuse to issue a license where the applicant has committed a felony or
crime involving moral turpitude140 or where the applicant fails to
demonstrate that he possesses good moral character.' It is virtually
impossible to show that a licensing board has acted in an arbitrary or
capricious manner when the board can point to precedent to justify
its decision. For example, so varied are the court decisions as to what
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude that precedent can in-
evitably be found, although consistency is almost totally absent. In
Tellenghast v. Edmead142 the petty larceny conviction of an "ignorant
colored girl" working as a domestic was held to be a crime involving
moral turpitude, whereas in United States v. UhI143 the possession of a
"Jimmy" which had been "adapted, designed and commonly used for
the commission of crimes of burglary and larceny" was not construed
to be a crime involving moral turpitude. In United States v. Day 44
assault in the second degree while intoxicated constituted a crime in-
volving moral turpitude, whereas in United States v. Zimmerman'45 the
escape of a bank robber from jail while he was awaiting trial did not.
rn Rousseau v. Weidin4" a conviction for the unlawful sale of intoxi-
cating liquor was held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, whereas
in Hampton v. Wong Song 4 7 a conviction under the Narcotics Act
was held not to be. Berlando v. Robinson 48 held that larceny or theft
was a crmie malum in se, and for that reason involved moral turpitude.
Then, as if to prevent any subsequent second guessing, the court added
"[w] e are not here presented with a case of a father stealing a loaf of
bread for his starving children or any facts of an extenuating nature
whatsoever. Unmitigated larceny as thus committed by Berlando is a
crime involving moral turpitude." 149
The difficulty that exists with a crime involving moral turpitude as
140. See Appendix rnfra.
141. See Appendix infra.
142. 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929)
143. 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939).
144. 15 F.2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
145. 71 F Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
146. 284 F 565 (9th Cir. 1922)
147. 299 F. 289 (9th Cir. 1924).
148. 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1959)
149. Id. at 851.
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the legislative standard is not eliminated when the standard is changed
to require the prior offender to show that he possesses good moral
character. In fact, the burden is often increased because there is a prima
facie presumption that the former offender does not possess good moral
character.150 Although the presumption is rebuttable, 5' it appears that
only in extreme cases will a court alter an administrative determma-
tion. 5 2
The wisdom of so empowering a licensing board becomes increas-
ingly doubtful after an examination of the decisions of a thoughtful
judge, such as Learned Hand, as he struggled to make the same kind of
determnations.15  Moreover, in a relatively recent decision,'5 the Su-
preme Court held that a good moral character requirement was "[y] et
another choice to give a registrar power to permit an applicant to vote
or not depending solely on the registrar's own whim or caprice. ,, 155
By analogy the Supreme Court's castigation is further evidence that the
courts are not compelled to permit the discretionary power of the li-
censing boards to continue unchecked.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between occupational licensing and rehabilitation is
capable of relatively simple resolution by either the courts or the legis-
latures. All that seems to be required is a sensitivity to the reality that
neither the licensed group nor the class traditionally excluded, prior
offenders, can be looked at in isolation, and that their impact upon each
other must be taken into account when legislation is considered or
challenged. Even without making sweeping changes, the overall posi-
ton of the ex-offender could be altered and improved. If such a change
150. Hirsch v. City and County of San Francisco, 143 Cal. App. 2d 313, 300 P.2d
177 (1956).
151. United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 921 (2d Cir. 1929).
"[A] person may have a 'good moral character' though he has been delinquent in
the past: It is enough if he shows that he does not transgress the accepted cannons
more often than is usual." Posusta v. United States, 285 F2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1961).
152. Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270, 276 (1960). Here the applicant produced
161 affidavits and 13 witnesses in support of his plea that he possessed good moral
character.
153. See Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1961); Schrmdt v. United
States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949); Repouille v. United States, 165 F2d 152 (2d Cir.
1947); United States ex rel. Berlando v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940); United
States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1929).
154. United States v. Mississippi, 360 U.S. 128. (1965).
155. Id. at 133.
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of attitude is communicated to the inmate, then the attitude of the in-
mate regarding his own potential might also change.
As a rule of thumb for future construction of legislative standards in
licensing, it is suggested that "felony" be interpreted to include only
those offenses which can reasonably be said to relate to the occupation
involved. This is not an entirely new approach. For example, through-
out the country real estate brokers are refused licenses if they have been
convicted of forgery, false pretenses, etc., which are offenses clearly re-
lated to the profession of selling land. 1' There is no indication that a
conviction for draft evasion or smoking marijuana is sufficient to exclude
a prospective land salesman. Further refinement requires that not only
the type of felony be relevant, but also that the time when the felony
was committed also be considered. Again, legislation has already ac-
knowledged this principle. For example, applications for liquor and
pharmacy licenses' 57 are often refused when there has been an offense
within five years of the application. This indicates some acceptance by
legislatures that tume heals, and the judicial teaching in Silver v. Green 58
indicates a similar recognition. The same considerations are necessary
with regard to occupational licensing statutes with crime involving
moral turpitude and good moral character standards. Both the crime and
the individual's character should be interpreted so that they relate to the
calling. As a standard, it is suggested that a more meaningful test would
be "dishonorable conduct relevant to the occupation."
In the final analysis, whatever approach is taken in the future the
route chosen must not be the one in which
[i]t is perfectly obvious that it constitutes the very antithesis of
rehabilitation, for instead of guiding the offender back into the
useful paths of society it excommunicates him and makes him lit-
erally an outcast. I can think of no more certain way in which
to make a man in whom rest the seeds of antisocial behavior more
likely to pursue further a career of unlawful activity than to
place on him the stigma of a derelict. 159
At present the choices open to the ex-offender are few There is a
great need to do away with the existing barriers to his entry into the
work force. This is the only way that the state's rehabilitative system
156. See Appendix infra.
157. See Appendix infra.
158. 207 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1962).
159. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
(Vol. 13 794
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
can have any hope of guaranteeing the prisoner a viable future as well
as a tolerable present. If society re-evaluates the effectiveness of the
present rehabilitation system it can aid not only the ex-offender but
itself as well.
APPENDIX
The following is a cross sample of state legislation which has the
effect of placing a prior offender at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the rest of
the general population. As with the preceding text, the emphasis is on
employment and occupational licensing. The first column indicates the
activity under consideration. The next three columns include those
provisions which can result in the singling out of prior offenders and the
refusal to issue the license or other privilege. The relevant grounds for
refusal, and the abbreviations used, are:
(a) commission of a felony (Felony)
(b) commission of a crime involving moral turpitude (Moral
Turp.)
(c) proof of good moral character (G.M.C.)
The next three columns concern the revocation of the license. The
categories here are almost the same-commission of a felony (Felony),
commission of a crime involving moral turpitude (Moral Turp.), and
an "others" column.
While the charts are extremely informative with respect to the varia-
tions in state legislation and show clearly the irrationality of the whole
licensing system, they are incomplete in a few respects. They do not
indicate whether or not there is to be a mandatory or discretionary re-
fusal or revocation where there has been the comnussion of a felony or
a crime involving moral turpitude. Of course, there is discretion where
there is good moral character requirement, and in some instances there
would appear to be discretion as to what offenses include moral
turpitude.
Not included are the various states' legislation on divorce, juries, or
witnesses, as such legislation applies to prior offenders, although every
state has provisions which deal specifically therewith. As suggested in
the introduction, it was hoped that where discretion is given to a board
the Appendix would include some statement of policy, but unfoxtun-
ately most boards were not prepared to propose such statements.
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